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A parte, something to sing, but only for the most venerable 
ears of Prince Bismarck: 
Poland is not yet lost, -
For Niezky still lives... (KSA14,483) 
In Nomine 
Heidegger's ''Nietzsche' speaks volumes. The fact that he was able 
to choose as the title for his study simply the surname of the philosopher 
tells us something about the reputation he himsel f had gained by that stage 
( 1961 ), about the rather less crowded field which was 'Nietzsche studies' 
thirty-five years ago (few publishers nowadays would allow such a 
monograph to eschew a subtitle if it were not part of an established series), 
and perhaps about the Westem cultural canon in general (since Umberto 
Eco's novel, for example, who are we to understand by 'Foucault'?). 
But the irreducibiüty of Heidegger's tide is also intentionally prograinmatic, 
foras he explains at the opening ofhis Foreword: '"Nietzsche" - the 
name of the thinker stands as the title for the matter ofhis thinking.'1 The 
strength of this claim emerges when we are later told that 'each thinker 
thinks only onesingle thought', and that for Heidegger Nietzsche's singular 
thought is 'the thought that he gave shape to in the phrase "the will to 
power"',2 for which the name 'Nietzsche' can thus be deemed to function 
as a kind of monolithic metonym. However, Jacques Derrida resists the 
reductivism of this gesture and responds with a rhetorical question: 'Next 
to Kierkegaard, was not Nietzsche one of the few great thinkers who 
multiplied his names and played with signatures, identities, and masks?'3 
The pertinence of Derrida's question is most signally demonstrated by 
the last letter Nietzsche wrote to his former colleague and lifelong friend 
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Jacob Burckhardt, on 5 January 1889, in which he indulges in a veritable 
orgy of identifications. The letter begins, famously: 'Dear Professor: 
Actually 1 would much rather be a Basel professor than God; but I have 
not ventured to carry my private egoism so far as to omit creating the 
world on his account' (Middleton, p.346; KGB 111/5,577f.). Not content 
with being 'just' God, however, in the rest of this one letter Nietzsche 
proceeds to claim that he is a whole succession of (mostly deceased) 
nobles, architecturally-minded diplomats and 'decent criminals' then in 
the news: King Carlo Alberto of Sardinia, his sons Count Robilant and 
the late King of Italy Vittorio Emmanuele 11, de Lesseps and Antonelli, 
Prado, Prado's father and Chambige. 'The unpleasant thing,' he writes, 
'and one that nags my modesty, is that at root every name in history is I'. 
This letter is undoubtedly a testament to Nietzsche's recent collapse into 
(dia)chronic megalomania, and it was interpreted as such by its recipient, 
but when Nietzsche claims Caesar as one ofhis 'incarnations', in a 
contemporaneous letter to Cosima Wagner (KGB 111/5,573), this is more 
than simply an indication that he has just crossed his own tragic Rubicon, 
for in all these late letters we can see him taking to an extreme a practice 
which has been prevalent throughout his philosophical writings, that of 
identifying with historical characters. In January 1889 Nietzsche achieves 
apotheosis Via Carlo Alberto, he breaks down in Turin, but throughout 
his career the question ofNietzsche's xdentity breaks down into the question 
ofNietzsche's identifications. This pluralised identity is the (oxymoronic) 
starting point for my paper, and for the wider project of which it is a part 
- an exploration of Nietzsche s Figures, the role-call of personages who 
go to make up the dramatis personae ofhis philosophy. 
'Nietzsche's name', pace Heidegger, is no singularity buta subsumptive, 
synoptic aggregate: it is 'Nietzsches' name', always already irreducibly 
plural, if only in the trivial sense which Heidegger ignores, namely that 
from birth 'the Antichrist/ian' has two Christian names. But for Nietzsche 
even this given is no trivial matter, and on his own analysis the conjunction 
ofhis three given names precludes any conveniently unproblematic one-
to-one correspondence of the kind Heidegger would seek to establish. 
As Nietzsche recounts in the manuscript of Ecce Homo, he was given his 
Christian names - 'the Hohenzollern names Friedrich Wilhelm' - in 
recognition of the birthday he shared with the then ruling King of Prussia, 
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Friedrich Wilhelm IV, for whom his reverend father 'was full of a deep 
reverence', while his súmame betrays the fact that he is descended, on his 
father's side, from a long line of Polish nobility.4 The names of the thinker 
do indeed ' stand for the matter ofhis thinking', but the conflicted Sache 
they represent - for Nietzsche himself- is a 'genealogical' (physiological/ 
typological) indi vi-duality, an inner division between his German and Polish 
'instincts' which exist in a state of constant agonal tension. Now, as we 
shall see, Nietzsche's 'alleged Polish descent' was in fact a figment ofhis 
imagination - Sarah Kofman terms this whole passage in Ecce Homo an 
exercise in 'fantastic genealogy'5 - but its affective import was nonetheless 
profound. In his youth Nietzsche the musician composed 'a little booklet 
of mazurkas' dedicated "To the Memory of Our Forefathers'" (KSA 9, 
681 f.),6 but in the 1880s Nietzsche the philosopher takes his cue from the 
Op. 13 ofhis namesake and would-be countryman Fryderyk Chopin, 
composing a ' Grande fantaisie on Polish Airs' which crescendos to a 
tempestuous climax in 1888. This fantasy develops out of a 'figure' with 
whom Nietzsche identifies from early on in his philosophical career, 
Copemicus, and it is on his constmetion of this figure that I want to 
concentrate here. 
Copcrnican Revolutions 
Kant was not one to stoop very often to 'examples and explanations, 
which are necessary only from a/jopu/or point of view',7 but in the Preface 
to the second edition of his First Critique he does grace us with an 
unwonted analogy: 
Wc here propose to do just what Copernicus did in 
attempting to explain the celestial movements. When he 
found that he could make no progress by assuming that 
all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he 
reversed the process, and tried the experiment of assuming 
that the spectator revolved, while the stars remained at 
rest. We may make the same experiment with regard to the 
intuition of objects.8 
Since one ofNietzsche's fundamental motivations was to out-Kant Kant,9 
in the context of this well-known passage it is no surprise that he should 
be interested in Copemicus; what is perhaps surprising is that he should 
show so little interest in him from this Kantian perspective. For all the 
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'experimentalism' ofhis own philosophy, Nietzsche does not thematise 
Copemicus's experimental method (although it is this aspect ofhis analogy 
which leads Kant himself to ooa/K/ow it, finding it too dangerous to sustain 
for long);10 he also goes beyond simply exploiting the metaphor of 
'Copemican revolution' and does not apply it, as he so easily might have, 
to his own 'revaluation of all values'." Instead, his attention is drawn to 
Copemicus as a historical figure, and he treats his life as a chapter in what 
one might call the social psychology of scientific revolutioa The Copemican 
role-model is itself plural, and in adopting it Nietzsche follows not Kant 
but Goethe, who records his admiration for Copemicus in the Farbenlehre 
as follows: 
But of all discoveries and convictions, nothing may have 
produced a greater effect on the human spirit than the 
doctrine of Copemicus. The world had scarcely been 
acknowledged as round and complete in itself when it 
was obliged to forgo the tremendous privilege of being 
the centre of the universe. Never, perhaps, has a greater 
demand been made on mankind: for through this 
recognition so many things went up in smoke: a second 
paradise, a world of innocence, poetry and piety, the 
evidence of the senses, the conviction of a poetic-
religious faith; no wonder people did not want to let all 
this go and mobilised all possible resistance to such a 
doctrine, which authorised and demanded of those who 
accepted it a hitherto unknown, indeed unimagined 
freedom of thought and grandeur of attitude.'2 
Nietzsche's Copemicus is likewise a revolutionary idoloclast who met 
with incomprehending inertia on the part ofhis contemporaries, for Poland, 
ironically enough, was 'the only country in western-Roman culture never 
to experience a Renaissance' (KSA 8,530f.). 
The first references to Copemicus in Nietzsche's work are to be found 
in the notebooks from his student years, in August-December 1865. Here 
he charts the development in occidental cosmology from 'The World-
View [Weltanschauung] of the Catholic Middle Ages' through 'The 
World-View of Protestant Orthodoxy' to 'The Modem World-View' and 
remarks that in the time of the Reformation: 'Despite Copemicus people 
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held on to their old heaven, their old earth and their old hell' (FS 111, 126), 
whereas nowadays: T/ie Copemican world-view has entered the 
bloodstream of our time. The difference between heaven and earth has 
fallen away, and with it hell, and with itangels anddevils' (FS III, 128). 
Here Copemicus is cited as the exemplary protestant, and ranks even 
higher in this respect than Luther, another figure with whom Nietzsche 
often identifies but who is here dismissed as less progressive, 'merely a 
child ofhis time'. Copemicus is a heterodox cleric who rebels against the 
theocratic order and succeeds in taking the first and most decisive step 
towards the démystification of the world, the abolition ofthat invidious 
distinction between 'real' and 'apparent' worlds which Nietzsche himself 
will allegorise in the section of Twilight of the Idols entitled 'How the 
Real World Finally Became a Fable', and which will culminate in his own 
proclamation of the death of metaphysics, the death of God. As Nietzsche 
reminds himself almost two decades after this initial note, 'God and Man' 
is 'the standpoint before Copemicus' (KSA 10,643). 
Nietzsche's emphasis on the contemporary resistance to Copemicus's 
findings is also apparent in the first passage in his published writings where 
Copemicus is invoked, in the third Untimely Meditation, Schopenhauer 
as Educator, where he thematises the self-satisfaction ('Biederkeit') with 
which the academic also-rans have invariably greeted the innovations of 
the great scientific pioneers: 
And because everything new makes it necessary to 
releam, this self-satisfaction, in case of need, will always 
revere the old opinion and reproach anyone who proclaims 
the new with a lack of sensus recti. It certainly resisted 
the teachings of Copemicus because in this case it had 
appearance [den Augenschein] and convention on its 
side. (UM, 111, 6) 
Copemicus is figured as the doughtiest doubter, the genius who sought to 
blow away the conceptual cobwebs, or rather to remove the scales from 
people's eyes - for he is the greatest opponent of appearance, 
'Augenschein', literally of how things appear to the eyes. Nietzsche is 
following Goethe very closely here, for Friedrich von Müller reports the 
following remark of Goethe's from 26 February 1832: 
69 
D. Large 
The greatest truths often flatly contradict the senses, in 
fact they almost always do. The movement of the Earth 
around the Sun - to all appearances [dem Augenschein 
nach] what could be more absurd? And yet it is the 
greatest, noblest, most momentous discovery man has 
ever made; to my mind more important than the whole 
Bible.13 
Following Goethe, Nietzsche treats Copemicus as the arch-combatant of 
theological dogmatism, the heroic and representative scientist who 
succeeds in unseating humanity from the centre of the universe, in unmasking 
perhaps the most fundamental of the 'anthropomorphisms' which had 
previously passed as truths. In Schopenhauer as Educator Nietzsche 
establishes 'the teachings of Copemicus' as a benchmark against which 
sixteenth-century 'self-satisfaction' can be judged, and even much later in 
his philosophical career, in 1887/88, Copemicus will still serve this purpose, 
when Nietzsche's critique of'resistance' has sharpened into an attack on 
the 'resentment' symptomatic of a 'slave mentality'. For the debilitated 
'herd-men' in every period want only to level down the uncommon 
achievements of the great to their miserable common denominator: their 
watchword is 'cut off Cicero's tongue, blind Copemicus, stone 
Shakespeare'(KSA 13,147). 
But the value to Nietzsche of Copemicus's example is far greater than 
this, for his revolutionary achievement in overturning the prevailing world-
view remains a point of reference for scientific endeavour in the modem 
age, and it is in this context that Nietzsche writes ofhim in the most famous 
passage in which he is mentioned - most famous because it was included 
by Nietzsche's philosophical executors as the first section ('Toward an 
Outline') in The Will to Power. Here, discussing 'the nihilistic 
consequences of contemporary natural science (together with its attempts 
to escape into some beyond)', Nietzsche remarks: 'The industry of its 
pursuit eventually leads to self-disintegration, opposition toitself, an anti-
scientific mentality. - Since Copemicus man has been rolling from the 
centre toward x' (WP 1 ). Now although Nietzsche himself abandoned 
The Will to Power asa project in late August/early September 1888 (cf. 
KSA 14,398), he had already salvaged this particular passage, a note 
from the period summer-autumn 1886 (KSA 12,126f.). From a separate 
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but contemporary notebook (KSA 12,203) it becomes clear that 'Belittling 
of man since Copemicus' ('Verkleinerung des Menschen seit Copemicus') 
was considered for inclusion inBeyond Good and Evil, and although it 
was passed over for that text it was eventually incorporated into the Third 
Essay of On the Genealogy of Morals. Here Nietzsche takes up the 
theme of the nihilistic consequences of natural science as part ofhis tour 
d'horizon of crypto-ascetics, arguing that '"modem science'" is not nearly 
self-reliant enough to create new values, with the result that it remains in 
involuntary service to the very ascetic ideal it prides itself on having 
overcome: 
Has the self-belittlement of man [die Selbst-Verkleinerung 
des Menschen], his will to self-belittlement, not 
progressed irresistibly since Copernicus? [...] Since 
Copemicus, man seems to have got himself on an inclined 
plane - now he is slipping faster and faster away from the 
centre into - what? into nothingness? into a 'penetrating 
sense of his nothingness'? ... Very well! hasn't this been 
the straightest route to - theoW ideal? (CM, III, 25) 
Nietzsche evidently viewspoji-Copemican science in a poor light (the 
twilight of the ideal), but it should be noted that Copemicus himself is 
exempted from Nietzsche's swingeing irony, for Copemicus was 
astonishingly successful in engineering 'the defeat of theological astronomy', 
and it is his degenerate epigones, inescapably mired in the ascetic ideal, 
who come in for the fiercest criticism on account of their inability or 
unwillingness to emulate his audacity and take his discovery to its logical 
limit (which is where Nietzsche himself comes in).I4 These lesser luminaries 
have shied away from confronting and affirming nihilism, let alone 
overcoming it, and have drawn back from the abyss, taking refuge instead 
on the path of least resistance, in a new transcendentalism. It is at this 
point that Nietzsche makes the only connection in his writings between 
Copemicus and Kant, for the latter, in Nietzsche's eyes, is the most 
egregious culprit in this scandalous act of selling Copemicus short. Far 
from succeeding in his own 'Copemican revolution', Kant, for Nietzsche, 
simply finesses the ascetic ideal, and On the Genealogy of Morals maries 
the centenary of Kant's Preface by continuing sarcastically at his expense: 
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AU science (and by no means only astronomy, on the 
humiliating and degrading effect of which Kant made the 
noteworthy confession: 'it destroys my importance*...), 
all science, natural as well as unnatural - which is what I 
call the self-critique of knowledge - has at present the 
object of dissuading man from his former respect for 
himself, as if this had been nothing but a piece of bizarre 
conceit. [...] Is this really to ivor^agaiVu/the ascetic ideal? 
Does one still seriously believe (as theologians imagined 
for a while) that Kant's victory over the dogmatic concepts 
of theology ('God*, 'soul', 'freedom', 'immortality') 
damaged that ideal? - it being no concern of ours for the 
present whether Kant ever had any intention of doing 
such a thing. What is certain is that, since Kant, 
transcendentalists of every kind have once more won the 
day - they have been emancipated from the theologians: 
what joy! - Kant showed them a secret path by which 
they may, on their own initiative and with all scientific 
respectability, from now on follow their 'heart's desire'. 
(GM, III, 25) 
Nietzsche refuses to let Kant get away with considering himself a worthy 
inheritor of the Copemican mantle, for the categorical imperative still 
grounds the astronomical observer of the 'starry firmament above' in a 
metaphysics of morals: at bottom Kant is but a 'crafty Christian' (TI, III, 
6). By Nietzsche's reckoning Copemicus may have been a nihilist - he 
could not have been otherwise, for he inaugurated the period of dominance 
of the ascetic ideal in its modem scientific inflection - but he was at least 
an 'active nihilist', a destroyer of the old values (KSA 12,350f./WP 22-
23), whereas Kant is just a 'passive nihilist', a 'critic' and 'scientific 
labourer' (BGE 211) who diligently obfuscates in the wake of the genuinely 
'free spirit' only to end up, like the pessimist Hartmann, 'arbitrarily 
incarcerating' himself in 'the pre-Copemican prison and field of vision' 
(KSA 12, 168/WP 789). Back in 1865 Nietzsche had noted Lange's 
observation that the Catholic church considered Copemicus's theory a 
'Pythagorean doctrine' (FS III, 333), but he himself salutes it as a visionary 
Weltanschauung which liberated man from the tyranny of appearance 
and thus prepared the way for his own entrance on the philosophical 
scene, centre stage, as the 'genuine philosopher ', the creator of new values, 
'Europe's first perfect nihilist, who has nevertheless already lived nihilism 
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through to its end in himself- who has it behind him, beneath him, outside 
him...' (KSA 13,190/WP, 'Preface', 3). 
Copernicus and Boscovich 
In Schopenhauer as iä/Mcator Nietzsche presents Copemicus as the 
great antagonist of appearance ('Augenschein'), but later on he also grants 
this accolade to another figure, to the mathematician, astronomer and 
physicist Roger Joseph Boscovich (Rudjer Josip Boskovic), whose main 
work. Theory of Natural Philosophy {1758), he read as early as 1873, 
when he became captivated by its refutation of the atomic model of matter.15 
Although Nietzsche read Boscovich before writingSchopenhauer as 
Educator, he does not actually cite him until the 1880s, when Boscovich 
and Copemicus are almost invariably yoked together. In a note from 
autumn 1881, for example, Nietzsche writes: 'The two greatest opponents 
of appearance [Gegner des Augenscheins] are Copemicus and 
Boscovich, both Poles and both clerics - the latter was the first to destroy 
the superstitious belief in matter, with his doctrine of the mathematical 
character of the atom' (KSA 9, 643). He uses the same phrase 
('Boscovich [...] and Copemicus are the two greatest opponents of 
appearance') in a letter to Köselitz of 20 March 1882 (Middleton, p. 182; 
KGB 111/1,183), and the importance of these two interrelated figures to 
him personally is apparent in a note from summer-autumn 1884 in which 
he reviews his own 'philosophical genealogy' and remaries that he considers 
'Boscovich one of the great turning-points, like Copemicus' (KSA 11, 
266). These observations on Copemicus and Boscovich eventually find 
their place in the published writings in paragraph 12 of Beyond Good 
and Evil, Nietzsche's most forthright attack on the 'atomistic prejudice' 
of the scientists: 
As for materialistic atomism, it is one of the best-refuted 
things there are; and perhaps no scholar in Europe is still 
so unscholarly today as to accord it serious significance 
except for handy everyday use (as an abbreviated means 
of expression) - thanks above all to the Pole Boscovich 
who, together with the Pole Copernicus, has been the 
greatest and most triumphant opponent of appearance 
[Gegner des Augenscheins] hitherto. For while 
Copemicus persuaded us to believe, contrary to all the 
senses, that the earth does not stand firm, Boscovich 
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taught us to abjure belief in the last thing of earth that 
'stood firm', belief in 'substance', in 'matter', in the earth-
residuum and particle atom: it was the greatest triumph 
over the senses hitherto achieved on earth. (BGE 12) 
For Nietzsche, then, Boscovich shares with Copemicus in all the Goethean 
virtues which we have seen so far - he is another archetypal scientist 
striving to combat the prejudice of the senses, in fact the greatest and 
most heroic of all in this respect - but he also shares with Copemicus 
another attribute, which Goethe does not dwell on (and nor does Kant, 
for that matter), namely the virtue - in Nietzsche's eyes - of being Polish. 
For it is noticeable here that Nietzsche chooses to rank both Copemicus 
and Boscovich high in his own personal 'philosophical genealogy' as Poles, 
as representing that national character of which he is (or would like to be) 
the most illustrious example of all. 
'Illustrious Poles' 
At this juncture one should point out that Boscovich was not in fact Polish: 
he was bom in 1711 in Ragusa, Dalmatia (present-day Dubrovnik in 
Croatia), to a Dalmatian father and Italian mother, spent the greater part 
ofhis life in Italy and died in Milan in 1787, having been naturalised a 
Frenchman in 1774.16 Boscovich was by birth at least a Slav; he did 
spend a few months in Poland in 1762, and he published an account ofhis 
travels there as well as an essay on the political system of the country,17 
but it seems that Nietzsche is so keen to draw an analogy between 
Boscovich and Copemicus that he goes so far as to invent a nationality 
fin* him. 
For Nietzsche it stands to reason that Boscovich, like Copemicus, 
must be a Pole because he shows the same spirit of individuality, 
independence and innovation that characterises the nationality which could 
dream up the political institution of the 'liberum veto' or 'unrestricted 
veto', the convention according to which, in the mediaeval diets, if any 
one nobleman vetoed a decision then it could not be implemented. The 
fact that the liberum veto was a disaster as a workable political system is 
incidental to Nietzsche - in fact if anything it only goes to recommend the 
Polish/jo/ts to this 'last anti-political German'. Even as a boy, he reflects 
in an important passage from the summer of 1882, the Poles had 
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particularly appealed to him: 
The Poles struck me as the most talented and chivalrous 
of the Slavic peoples; and the talents of the Slavs seemed 
to me greater than those of the Germans, indeed I even 
thought that the Germans had joined the ranks of the 
talented nations only through a strong mixture with Slavic 
blood. It did me good to think of the Polish nobleman's 
right to overturn the resolution of a diet with his single 
veto; and the Pole Copernicus seemed to me simply to 
have made the greatest and most worthy use of this right, 
in directing it against the resolution and appearances [den 
Augenschein] of everyone else. The political 
boisterousness and weakness of the Poles, like their 
dissipation, were more a proof to me of their talents than 
of the opposite. (KSA 9,682) 
Copemicus, as arch-wielder of the liberum veto, is refigured here as the 
archetypal Polish nobleman, for whom Nietzsche shows such a fondness 
because, as he explains, 'I was taught to trace the descent of my blood 
and name back to Polish noblemen who were called Niëtzky'. It is no 
coincidence that at precisely the time Nietzsche is developing a self-image 
as 'free spirit', in the early 1880s, he should begin to dwell - for the first 
time since his childhood - on his origins among this race of'free spirits' 
par excellence. Moreover, in a passage which was drafted as an 
Introduction to The Gay Science, it is only natural that Nietzsche should 
tum to Poland's most celebrated scientist, Copemicus, for his identificatoiy 
model. 
'The Copemican world-view has entered the bloodstream of our 
time', Nietzsche wrote back in 1865, but it is not till the 1880s that this 
metaphor becomes activated for his own personal purposes. In a letter 
of 20 August 1880 to Köselitz from Marienbad, Nietzsche writes: 'There 
are many Poles here and - remarkably [es ist wunderlich] - they take me 
for a Pole through and through, come up to me with Polish greetings and 
- won't believe me when I claim to be Swiss' (KGB III/l, 37; cf. KSA 9, 
681 ). He had indeed adopted Swiss nationality a decade before, on his 
move to Basel, but his evident surprise here at being taken for a Pole is 
short-lived, and further correspondence from the first half of the 1880s 
illustrates the growth ofhis renewed interest in family history. 'Consider 
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my name: my forebears were Polish aristocrats - even my grandfather's 
mother was Polish', he writes to Heinrich von Stein in early December 
1882 (Middleton, p.197; KGB DI/l, 287), and in a letter of 7 April 1884 
he confesses to Franz Overbeck: '1 am ashamed to know so little about 
thePo/eç (who, after all, are really my "ancestors"!)' (Middleton, p.221 ; 
KGB 111/1,494). 
Even beyond the period of the 'free spirit trilogy', then, Nietzsche 
continues to proclaim his Polishness, and with increasing vehemence, for 
in the later 1880s his Polish identity takes on a new meaning beyond an 
association with the land offheliberum veto - specifically, being Polish 
means not being German. In the wake of the founding of the Reich -
which, in the first Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche was already deeming 
synonymous with 'the extirpation of the German spirit' (UM, 1,1 ) - his 
hostility to his German contemporaries became evermore pronounced, 
and culminated in that wickedly barbed section of Twilight entitled 'What 
the Germans Lack'. By 1888 Nietzsche was finding his German pedigree 
quite intolerable, and he adopted a variety of strategies for denying it. He 
had already been spending as much ofhis time as possible outside his 
native country - ten years in an academic post in Basel, a further nine 
shuttling between the Upper Engadine in the summer and the Italian and 
French Rivieras in the winter - and while physically his centrifugal movement 
took him to points south, intellectually it took him to all the other points of 
the compass as well. The first recognition ofhis philosophy came from 
the north, from the Danish philosopher Georg Brandes who gave a lecture 
series on his work in Copenhagen in 1888, to Nietzsche's great delight;18 
to the west lay France, and in 1888 Nietzsche's long admiration for French 
culture heightened to such an extent that he began claiming his works of 
that year were actually written in French,19 that 'it is high time I returned 
to the world as a Frenchman' (KGB 111/5,535).20 Even in this late letter 
to Jean Bourdeau, though, Nietzsche writes that his 'forefathers were 
Polish nobles', and his most determined attempt at disavowing his Germanic 
origins remains in 1888 his ever more vociferous assertion that his origins 
lie to the east, in Poland. 
Yet Nietzsche's Polish roots were a fiction. As with his construction of 
Boscovich, with the constmetion ofhis own identity we are in the realm of 
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'fantastic genealogy' - although, ironically enough, one characteristic he 
undoubtedly <//i/share with his fellow-pseudo-Pole was the penchant for 
making unwarranted claims to noble descent.2' Walter Kaufmann notes: 
'During the Nazi period, one ofNietzsche's relatives, Max Gehler, aretired 
major, went to great lengths to prove that Nietzsche had been racially 
pure', in publications such as the article 'Nietzsches angebliche polnische 
Herkunft' ('Nietzsche's Alleged Polish Descent') and the pamphlet 
Nietzsches Ahnentafel {Nietzsche s Pedigree).71 Oehler's researches 
have been home out by subsequent biographers of Nietzsche,23 though it 
is a further irony that at the same time as Gehler was successfully rescuing 
Nietzsche for the Fatherland, other scholars were seeking rather less 
convincingly to do precisely the same for Copemicus. Nor were they the 
first to do so, and it should not be forgotten that by styling-Copernicus a 
Pole Nietzsche was actually taking up a position in a heated debate. This 
debate had inevitably intensified with the rise in German nationalism through 
the nineteenth century, but as early as 1799 Lichtenberg, (otherwise) one 
ofNietzsche's favourite writers (cf. WS 109), wrote a layman's 
introduction to Copemicus for a series entitled Pan/Aeo« der Deutschen, 
in which he is at pains to establish his subject's Germanic pedigree and 
indeed makes Copemicus's greatness a function of his Prussian 
extraction.24 
At any rate, by 1888 Nietzsche had become perfectly convinced of 
his own Polish ancestry, and on April 10 ofthat year he sends a CV to his 
new admirer Brandes, which begins as follows: 
Curriculum vitae. I was bom 15 October 1844, on the 
battlefield oi Lätzen. The first name I heard was that of 
Gustav Adolf. My forebears were Polish aristocrats 
(Niëzky); it seems that the type has been well preserved, 
despite three German 'mothers'. Abroad, I am usually 
taken for a Pole; even this last winter the aliens' register 
in Nice had me inscribed comme Polonais.75 I have been 
told that my head and features appear in paintings by 
Matcjo.26 My grandmother belonged to the Goethe-
Schiller circle in Weimar; her brother became Herder's 
successor as superintendent-general of the churches in 
the duchy of Weimar. (Middleton, p.293; KGB 111/5,288) 
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The opening embellishment of the truth (Nietzsche was bom in Röcken, a 
few miles away from Liitzen) allows Nietzsche to strike a suitably martial 
pose,27 and his reference to the Swedish king Gustav Adolf is no doubt 
also calculated to bolster his Scandinavian credentials in the eyes ofhis 
Danish correspondent, but most significantly of all, the displacement of 
his birthplace to a seventeenth-century (and Napoleonic) battlefield 
establishes his identity as a site of conflict, the warring parties being the 
Polish (paternal) and German (matemal) aspects ofhis inheritance. He 
seeks to ' redeem' his German origins on his mother's side by pointing out 
that his matemal grandmother had been associated with Goethe (by this 
stage the only 'good German' he has left) and thus beyond reproach, but 
he does not try to deny these origins altogether, and this carefully 
constmcted self-image finds its way into the manuscript of £cce//omo: 
I am a Doppelgänger, I have a 'second' face in addition to 
the first. /1/K/perhaps also a third... Even by virtue of my 
descent I am permitted to look beyond all merely locally, 
merely nationally conditioned perspectives, it costs me 
no effort to be a 'good European'. On the other hand I am 
perhaps more German than present-day Germans, mere 
Reich Germans, are still capable of being -1, the lasta/i/i-
political German. And yet my ancestors were Polish 
noblemen: I have many of their racial instincts in my body, 
who knows? ultimately even the liberum veto. When 1 
consider how ofien on my travels I am addressed as a 
Pole and by Poles themselves, how rarely I am taken for a 
German, it might seem that I am one of those who have 
been merely sprinkled with Germanity. But my mother, 
Franziska Gehler, is in any event something very German; 
likewise my patemal grandmother, Erdmuthe Krause.3" 
Here the identification with Copemicus's liberum veto is at its most 
developed, but this particular paragraph became a cause célebre when it 
emerged in 1969 that, at the last, Nietzsche had intended it to be 
superseded by another which his sister had suppressed. It is not hard to 
guess why she should have done so, for in the later version the delicate 
balance which Nietzsche cultivates in his self-depiction as Tripelgänger, 
straddling the two traditions with a view beyond both, is overturned in 
favour of an impassioned outpouring of anti-German spleen directed 
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specifically against the mother and sister whose Germanity he could in 
reality do so little to counteract. In the new version, the passage runs as 
follows: 
And with this I touch on the question of race. I am a 
Polish nobleman of pur sang, to which not one drop of 
bad blood has been added, least of all German. When I 
look for my profoundest opposite, the incalculable 
pettiness of the instincts, I always find my mother and my 
sister-to think of me as related to such camnV/e would be 
a blasphemy against my divinity. [...] - But even as a Pole 
I am a monstrous atavism. One would have to go back 
centuries to find this noblest of races that the earth has 
ever possessed as instinctively pristine as I represent it. I 
have, against everything that is today called noblesse, a 
sovereign feeling of distinction - I wouldn't award the 
young German Kaiser the honour of being my coachman. 
(EH, 1.3) 
This was destined by Nietzsche to be the first reference to his Polish 
origins in print (his draft Introduction to The GaySciencehad not been 
used), but he clearly protests too much, for on the one hand the heightened 
vehemence in his denial ofhis German extraction certainly weakens the 
case for an acceptance of this 'fantastic genealogy'; on the other, with his 
talk of'pristine instincts' and 'purity of blood' he seems to be succumbing 
to a prefigurative perversion of'Blut und Boden' ideology, to be falling 
squarely back into the kind of overtly racist rhetoric which he had weaned 
himself off on breaking from Wagner. ^  In the 1882 letter to Heinrich von 
Stein quoted above, he had continued: 'my forebears were Polish 
aristocrats - even my grandfather's mother was Polish. Well, I regard it 
as a virtue to be half-German', but in this intemperate outburst from the 
very end ofhis philosophical career, and in other drafts and letters from 
the same period,30 the inner typological balance between the German and 
the Polish which Nietzsche had been scrupulously maintaining is definitively 
tilted: the Poles lose their counter-pole. The reference to his 'divinity' in 
this passage is already an indication of the proximity of its composition to 
the letter to Burckhardt from which I quoted at the outset, but in another 
ofhis last letters, addressed 'To the Illustrious Poles', Nietzsche obliges 
himself to forgo the tremendous privilege ofbeing the centre of the universe 
so as to spell out in the starkest terms imaginable the by now absolute 
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nature ofhis Polish identity: 
I belong to you, I am even more Pole than I am God, I want 
to bring you honour, as I am capable of bringing honour 
... I live among you as Matejo... 
The Crucified (KGB III/5,577) 
French Polish Finish 
Nietzsche constmcts his figure of Copemicus out of a complex series 
of associations and fantasies. Firstly he shares Goethe's exhilarated feeling 
of liberation at 'the greatest, noblest, most momentous discovery man has 
ever made' and depicts Copemicus as a heroic free spirit flying in the face 
of appearance and convention. Given the preponderance of optical 
metaphors in Nietzsche's ^erspectivistic' philosophy, it is perhaps 
surprising that he should not make reference to Copemicus as 
representativeortranower - in general he makes relatively sparing use of 
astronomical metaphors and references - but Copemicus is certainly a 
representative scientist and theological rebel. The author of On the 
Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres is indeed himself a representative 
revolutionary, but Nietzsche does not take the Kantian tum, since by now 
the notion of'Copemican revolution' had already become just another 
philosophical trope, common coin debased by the likes of Auguste 
Comte,31 and as a result his identification with the figure of Copemicus is 
more subtle - more internalised - than Kant's glibly metaphorical 
appropriation (did he discard the 1882 Introduction to The Gay Science 
because the Copemican reference/Aere would have been too obviously 
Kantian a gesture?). It is by criticising Kant's impartial 'revolution', the 
impartial resolution of the problem of nihilism by this starry-eyed 
metaphysical recidivist, that Nietzsche prepares the ground for his own 
more implicit claims to succeed his illustrious forebear. As he fearlessly 
diagnoses the vicissitudes of the ascetic ideal, having opted out of modernity 
with a well-timed exercise ofhis untimely liberum veto, Nietzsche does 
not merely emulate Copemicus - he becomes him. 
In the 1880s Copemicus is above all an exemplary Pole with whom 
Nietzsche can identify on account ofhis own imagined ancestry, for the 
more he exploits 'genealogy' as metaphor, the more he becomes interested 
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in his 'actual' family tree. But Copemicus is not the only Pole with whom 
Nietzsche identifies: Boscovich is made to fit the bill, as we have seen, 
and Matejko fits it anyway, as does Chopin, for whose music Nietzsche 
expresses a particular fondness (singling out not the 'Revolutionary' Étude, 
as one might perhaps expect, but the Barcarolle)?1 His most extreme 
expression of admiration for Chopin comes, unsurprisingly, in 1888, in 
Ecce Homo-, 
I shall never admit that a Germancou/d know what music 
is. What one calls German musicians, the greatest above 
all, axcforeigners, Slavs, Croats, Italians, Netherlanders -
or Jews: otherwise Germans of the strong race, extinct 
Germans, like Heinrich Schütz, Bach and Handel. I myself 
am still sufficient of a Pole [sic] to exchange the rest of 
music for Chopin. (EH, II, 7)" 
Poles become so important to Nietzsche, particularly in the later 1880s, 
because they can be set up in this way as models antagonistic to the 
'German spirit' (itself now dismissed as a contradiction in terms), but in 
his last year of philosophical activity Nietzsche's attempts to distance himself 
from his own German birth and inheritance by asserting his Polish origins 
become progressively more burlesque and desperate, till one is tempted 
to apply to Nietzsche himself his description of the decadent Socrates: 
'Everything about him is exaggerated, buffo, caricature' (TI, II, 4). In 
the final interpolation in Ecce Homo, where Nietzsche broaches 'the 
question of race', his Germanophobia reaches a level of virulence and 
violence previously unknown even in the writings of this most anti-German 
of Germans, and the baseness ofhis attack seems to belie the very 
typological - 'Polish' - nobility of instinct he wants so urgently to claim. 
Yet we should beware of assuming that even at this screaming extreme, 
at the height ofNietzsche's self-proclamation as 'pure-blooded' Pole, he 
has thereby fallen into a facile racism. As Kaufinann and Kofman have 
shown, 'the question of race' is never so simple with Nietzsche as it might 
appear,34 and just as we have seen that to the young Nietzsche 'pure-
blooded' Germans did not exist, owing to their ' strong mixture with Slavic 
blood', by the same token even at the end ofhis career there is no such 
thing as a 'pure-blooded' Pole in any straightforwardly racist sense. In 
1882, Nietzsche continues his projected Introduction to 77ie Gay Science 
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by shifting his focus from Copemicus to Chopin, whom he apparently 
admired in his youth for 'the fact that he freed music from German 
influences' (KSA 9,682). But Chopin is also criticised here, for, bom of 
a Polish mother and French father, he spent the majority ofhis creative life 
in Paris where, as Nietzsche adds, 'Chopin unfortunately lived too close 
to a dangerous current in the French spirit [...] - the stronger Slav proved 
unable to resist the narcotics of an over-refined culture'. In Ecce Homo, 
as we have seen, Chopin's stock rises markedly in Nietzsche's estimation, 
but French culture in general is here startlingly revalued: i believe only in 
French culture and consider everything in Europe that calls itself "culture" 
a misunderstanding, not to speak of German culture...' (EH, II, 3). It is 
in this context that Nietzsche confesses to Bourdeau he would like to be 
rebom a Frenchman, and that he makes the crucially revealing aside in 
Ecce Homo itself: 'It is not for nothing that the Poles are cal led the French 
among the Slavs' (EH, III, 2).35 
So even when, at the end of 1888, Nietzsche finally comes to abandon 
the German/Polish duality at the core ofhis being, he does so only in 
order to substitute another, a French/Polish duality which penetrates even 
to the heart ofthat 'pure Polishness' he so strenuously appropriates for 
himself. At the last, Torun acquires a new son (in Turin, Po-land), and 
Nietzsche finally succeeds in vetoing Germany, in voiding it from his 
genealogical topography, but he does so by 'bracketing' it out from east 
and west at the same time. Nietzsche's all-too-insufferable present as a 
German is comprehensively expunged by a twin fantasy, a simultaneous 
assertion ofhis Polish past and French future, and it is this topo-typological 
pincer movement that sustains the dynamic, agonal heterogeneity which is 
truly Nietzsche's 'life-blood'. His youthful mazurkas may have been 
conventional and derivative, but the Romantic Grande fantaisie ofhis 
maturity is thoroughly worthy of (the) late Chopin. Nietzsche's 'key 
signature' is a tonic tension established from the beginning, and his work 
develops as the Polish and German themes vie with each other to emerge 
as dominant. When the former finally wins out, in late 1888, this is but an 
imperfect close, which modulates to fhe interrupted cadence of January 
1889. 
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